

## Message Text

SECRET

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70

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 104640

R 121055Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9692

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 1906

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR,NATO,SP,NO

SUBJECT: SPAIN AND NATO

REF: A)STATE 91998

B) OSLO 1901

SUMMARY. IN REF. B, I INDICATED WHY I THOUGHT NORWAY WOULD NOT  
CHANGE ITS MIND ABOUT MAKING SOME GESTURE ACKNOWLEDGING SPAIN'S  
IMPORTANCE TO NATO. IN THIS MESSAGE, I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS  
OUR OPTIONS, LAYING PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE DESIRABILITY OF  
DEVELOPING A DEEPER DIALOGUE WITH NORWAY(AND PERHAPS OTHER LIKE-

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MINDED COUNTRIES) REGARDING FUTURE TRENDS ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA,

INCLUDING WAYS IN WHICH THE WEST MAY HELP TO PROMOTE A VIABLE  
DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE THERE TO COMMUNISM. END SUMMARY.

1. WE WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE ESSENTIALLY THREE OPTIONS:

A. WE CAN CONTINUE TO URGE NORWAY TO ACKNOWLEDGE IN SOME  
FASHION SPAIN'S CONTRIBUTION TO NATO, IF NOT AN ACTUAL LINK TO  
NATO. THIS APPROACH, IN MY JUDGEMENT, IS A TOTAL NON-STARTER. WITH  
THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF SOME CONSERVATIVE PARTY POLITICIANS, INFLUEN-

TIAL NORWEGIANS WILL DO NOTHING TO ENHANCE THE PRESTIGE OF THE  
FRANCO REGIME AND DELAY ITS DEMISE. TO PRESS THIS LINE OF APPROACH  
ON NORWAY CAN ONLY RESULT IN IRRITATION ON BOTH SIDES AND  
DISAPPOINTMENT AMONG OUR NORWEGIAN FRIENDS THAT, AS THEY SEE IT,  
WE HAVE LEARNED NOTHING FROM VIETNAM. THEY WOULD ARGUE STRONGLY  
THAT WE ARE JEOPARDIZING A FUTURE MEANINGFUL LINK BETWEEN SPAIN  
AND NATO BY TRYING TO BE RESPONSIVE TO THE EFFORTS OF A DYING  
FRANCO REGIME TO POSTPONE ITS DISAPPEARANCE.

B. WE CAN DELAY ANY FURTHER APPROACHES TO NORWAY UNTIL WE  
HAVE WORKED OUT SOME FORMULA RECOGNIZING SPAIN'S MILITARY SIGNI-  
FICANCE WHICH IS THE MINIMUM ACCEPTABLE TO MADRID AND THE MAXIMUM  
ACCEPTABLE TO THE ALLIANCE IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THOSE ALLIES PRE-  
PARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION WITH US. OBVIOUSLY, THE MORE BILATERAL  
IN SCOPE ANY SUCH FORMULA CAN BE MADE, THE EASIER IT WILL BE FOR  
NORWAY AND LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO ACCEPT IT TACITLY BY ABSTENTION.  
IN THAT SITUATION, I WILL TRY AND PERSUADE NORWAY TO FOLLOW ITS  
TRADITIONAL POLICY OF ABSTENTION WHEN FACED WITH ALTERNATIVES  
IT DISLIKES. THE POLITICAL COSTS OF THIS TACTICAL VARIANT ARE  
SOMEWHAT LESS THOUGH NOT ENTIRELY ABSENT.

C. WE CAN SHIFT THE FOCUS OF OUR APPROACH FROM THE IMMEDIATE  
NEED TO MEET THE DEMANDS BEING PUT UPON US BY MADRID TO THE LONG-  
TERM BASIC PROBLEM OF ENSURING THAT A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE  
TO COMMUNISM EVOLVES ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA. THE FACT THAT WE  
WERE KNOWN TO BE INVOLVED IN LONG-TERM PLANNING TO PROMOTE DEMO-  
CRACY IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL MIGHT, IN TURN, MAKE THE NORWEGIANS MORE  
AMENABLE TO SOME SMALL GESTURE ACKNOWLEDGING THE STRATEGIC  
IMPORTANCE OF SPAIN AS A COUNTRY, AS DISTINCT FROM THE FRANCO  
REGIME, TO THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE WEST. I WOULD SUGGEST,  
HOWEVER, THAT OUR PRIMARY REASON FOR ENGAGING IN SUCH A DIALOGUE  
SHOULD BE OUR CONCERN TO PREVENT THE COMMUNISTS FROM THROTTLING  
DEMOCRACY BEFORE IT CAN DEVELOP ON THE PENINSULA, AND OUR CONCERN  
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TO IMPROVE OUR IMAGE IN EUROPE, RATHER THAN OUR HOPE OF  
BUYING OFF THE NORWEGIANS BY A SOP TO THEIR DEMOCRATIC MISSIONARY  
ZEAL.

2. REGARDLESS OF THE ULTIMATE IMPACT OF EFFORTS BY OUTSIDERS TO  
AFFECT THE PACE AND DIRECTION OF CHANGE ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA,  
THERE ARE CLEAR ADVANTAGES IN A PURELY NORWEGIAN CONTEXT IN  
DISCUSSING THE QUESTION OF LONG TERM TRENDS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL

AND POSSIBLE WAYS TO AFFECT EVENTS THERE. I CAN FORESEE WHERE THE AMERICAN AND NORWEGIAN APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION IN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES, AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE ABOUT IT, MAY DIVERGE IN RESPONSE TO FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE PENINSULA. THE CHANCES THAT WE CAN KEEP OUR POLICIES IN STEP WOULD BE IMPROVED IF WE HAD REGULAR DIALOGUE ON THE SUBJECT WITH KEY NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS. INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND DIALOGUE WITH ONE OR MORE NORDIC COUNTRIES MAY ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO COMMON ACTION ON THE PART OF SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES ALONG LINES WHICH WE FAVOR. IT WAS ENCOURAGING TO SEE, FOR EXAMPLE THAT THE NORDIC FOREIGN MINISTERS IN HELSINKI DEVOTED TIME AND SOME WORDS IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE TO THE PROBLEM OF PORTUGAL'S FUTURE. COOPERATION WITH LIKE-MINDED STATES IN ENCOURAGING A DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL CERTAINLY CANNOT HURT OUR IMAGE WITH THE YOUNGER, ACTIVIST CIRCLES TRADITIONALLY CRITICAL OF THE U.S. AND, TO THE EXTENT THERE IS DISCREET CONSULTATION AMONG WESTERN STATES ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. THE WEST WILL BE IN A SOMEWHAT BETTER POSITION TO BRING INFLUENCE TO BEAR ON SHORT NOTICE THROUGH CONTACTS AND PROGRAMS ALREADY IN TRAIN, IF DEVELOPMENTS DICTATE SOME WESTERN ACTION.

3. I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS A SEEMING CONFLICT BETWEEN OUR IMMEDIATE AND LONGER-TERM OBJECTIVES, AT LEAST AS THEY CONCERN SPAIN. TO RETAIN OUR MILITARY BASES, WE NEED TO DEAL WITH THE GOVERNMENT IN POWER. OBVIOUSLY, WE RISK PROVOKING SPANISH IRE IF IT BECOMES KNOWN THAT WE ARE ENCOURAGING THE SCANDINAVIANS TO STRENGTHEN THE DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION TO FRANCO. (ONE RECALLS HOW WE PROVOKED PORTUGUESE IRE EARLIER WHEN WE PROVIDED SOME AID TO FRELIMO, BUT STILL MANAGED TO RETAIN OUR AZORES BASES.) HOPEFULLY, WE COULD APPEAR SYMPATHETIC TO BUT NOT THE ACTIVE INITIATOR OF EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A DEMOCRATIC ALTERNATIVE TO FRANCO.

4. NORWEGIAN OFFICIALS ARE CERTAINLY OPEN FOR A DIALOGUE ABOUT THE IBERIAN PENINSULA, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE LESS CLEAR IN THE CASE  
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OF SPAIN ABOUT WHAT THEY MIGHT DO TO INFLUENCE DEVELOPMENTS. IN MY MAY 8 LUNCHEON WITH FRYDENLUND, FORMIN AGREED WITH ME THAT THE WEST SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE PROBLEM OF SPAIN'S FUTURE LINKS WITH THE WEST. HE WONDERED WHAT HE MIGHT PERSONALLY DO IN THIS CONNECTION, AND NOTED THAT THE SPANIARDS HAD BEEN PRESSING THE NORWEGIANS TO RECEIVE SOMEONE FROM THEIR FOREIGN MINISTRY. IN MY APRIL 24 LUNCHEON WITH FINANCE MINISTER KLEPPE (REF.B), KLEPPE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NOT MUCH EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO LOOK TO THE FUTURE, BUT THAT A GROUP OF OLD TRADE UNION LEADERS IN NORWAY HAD MAINTAINED CONTACT OVER THE YEARS WITH MEMBERS OF THE SPANISH SOCIALIST OPPOSITION, AND SOME SMALL EFFORT HAD BEEN MADE TO CONTACT YOUNGER SPANIARDS. HE WAS MORE POSITIVE IN HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD AID TO PORTUGAL, NOTING THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT ONLY TO AID THE SOCIALISTS BUT ALSO TO KEEP IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE GOVERNMENT AND NOT ABANDON THE FIELD TO

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

----- 105492

R 121055Z MAY 75

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9693

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

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AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

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EXDIS

THE USSR, WHICH IS BECOMING ACTIVE WITH AID OFFERS IN FIELDS  
LIKE FISHING.

5. I HAVE NOT THOUGHT THROUGH THE FULL DIMENSIONS OF ANY DIALOGUE  
WITH THE NORWEGIANS ABOUT PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, BUT I CAN IMAGINE  
THAT IT COULD TAKE THE FOLLOWING FORMS:

A. I COULD RAISE DISCREETLY WITH KEY OFFICIALS LIKE THE  
PRIME MINISTER AND CHAIRMAN OF THE TRADE UNION ORGANIZATION THE  
DESIRABILITY OF AN ACTIVE NORDIC ROLE, INCLUDING GREATER NORWEGIAN  
LEADERSHIP.

B. STRESS THE MUTUAL ADVANTAGE OF SEEING THAT OUR ESTIMATES,  
POLICIES AND SPECIFIC PROGRAMS ARE GENERALLY IN STEP; CONVERSELY,  
WARN OF THE DANGER OF DISRUPTIVE COMPETITION BETWEEN COUNTRIES

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ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS (ALREADY APPARENT IN THE CASE OF SWEDEN AND NORWAY) FOR THE HONOR OF CARRYING THE DEMOCRATIC TORCH TO THE IBERIAN PENINSULA.

C. ARRANGE TO HAVE REGULAR EXCHANGES OF INFORMATION ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA AND WESTERN PROGRAMS THERE, FOCUSING ON ACTION-ORIENTED QUESTIONS E.G. SPECIFIC USEFUL PROGRAMS OFFICIALS OR PARTIES THE WEST SHOULD TRY AND CULTIVATE AND HOW.

D. ENCOURAGE SPECIFIC PROGRAMS WHERE APPROPRIATE AND DIRECTED BY THE DEPARTMENT E.G. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE AFL-CIO AND LO IN IDENTIFYING AND TRAINING NON-COMMUNIST TRADE UNIONISTS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL; ARRANGE FOR NATO TOURS FOR UNION LEADERS WITH INTENT TO EXPOSE THEM TO DISCUSSION OF SPANISH ISSUE.

E. ENCOURAGE OTHER DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL FORCES IN NORWAY (E.G. CENTER AND CHRISTIAN PEOPLE'S PARTY) TO DEVELOP CONTACTS WITH LIKE-MINDED POLITICIANS IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL, SUPPLEMENTING RATHER THAN COMPETING WITH THE PROGRAMS MONOPOLIZED HITHERTO BY THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC AND TRADE UNION FORCES IN SCANDINAVIA.

F. ARRANGE TO HAVE KNOWLEDGEABLE SPEAKERS ON THE LONGTERM MILITARY APPLICATIONS OF SPAIN FOR NATO ADDRESS THE DEFENSE COMMISSION WHICH IS NOW REVIEWING AND MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NORWAY'S LONGTERM DEFENSE ROLE AND POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF PRESENT INTERNATIONAL TRENDS; THIS REPORT IS SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED BY 1977.

G. GENERALLY, PLAY UP TO NORDIC MISSIONARY ZEAL, WARNING AGAINST THE TENDENCY DISCERNIBLE IN NORWAY, AT LEAST, TO RELAX CONCERN AND CORRESPONDING EFFORT FOLLOWING THE ENCOURAGING RESULTS OF THE PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS. THE MOST SERIOUS STRUGGLES WITH THE COMMUNISTS FOR CONTROL OF THE IBERIAN PENINSULA LIE AHEAD.

6. THE DEPARTMENT WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER IT IS APPROPRIATE AND EFFECTIVE FOR THE U.S. TO TRY AND PLAY A CATALYTIC ROLE IN INFLUENCING DEVELOPMENTS ON ( # )

THE DECISION IS POSITIVE, I CAN SEE ADVANTAGES FOR OUR INTERESTS AND IMAGE IN AT LEAST NORWAY--REGARDLESS WHETHER OUR EFFORTS HAVE ANY MEANINGFUL IMPACT ON THE PACE AND THRUST OF CHANGE IN PORTUGAL AND SPAIN, OR INDEED ELICIT THE DEGREE OF NORWEGIAN RESPONSE AND INITIATIVE THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE.

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7. THE ABOVE FIRST PERSON MESSAGE WAS APPROVED BY THE AMBASSADOR  
BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR THE NORDIC CHIEFS OF MISSION CONFERENCE  
IN STOCKHOLM.  
BUCHANAN

NOTE BY OC/T: OSLO 1906,(SECTION 2 OF 2)----(#) OMISSION; CORRECTION  
TO FOLLOW.

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## Message Attributes

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